We study the course of the Swiss price level during the recent episode where Switzerland enforced a floor on the Swiss Franc exchange rate relative to the Euro. Given the strong nominal upward pressure on the Swiss currency the introduced limit of 1.20 Francs per Euro led to a quasi-fixed exchange rate from 2011 until early 2015. This measure was specifically aimed at helping the firms of the Swiss export sector to compete internationally. A further reason for imposing this floor was the Swiss National Bank's concern with deflationary pressures. Interestingly, it turned out that during the episode with a quasi-fixed exchange rate the Swiss price level came under downward pressure. We offer an analysis that helps to understand this depreciation of the Swiss currency in real terms which in fact contributed to the exchange rate floor being eventually abandoned. The article thus clarifies some intricate mechanisms affecting the choice of exchange rate policies which are so important for firms in the export sector. As a theoretical contribution (complementing the well-known Balassa-Samuelson analysis) the article presents a computable equilibrium model that explains real exchange rate variations with diverging trends in the productivity growth of the non-traded goods sectors of economies.
Introduction
Business is strongly affected by developments of exchange rates. Exporting firms, e.g., directly experience changes in their competitive position as exchange rates vary, with an appreciating currency leading to revenue losses. However, the links between exchange rates and exchange rate policies, on the one hand, and business considerations, on the other hand, are much more complex. Switzerland's recent experience can help to highlight some of the more intricate links and considerations. A key variable that Swiss monetary policy has to consider in its strategy choices is the real exchange rate of the Swiss Franc relative to its major trading partners. In recent years the Swiss Franc price of Euros adjusted for the developments of the price levels in different economies has been at the center of monetary policy debates.
To start with, the Swiss Franc has been a floating currency since 1973. In the wake of the financial crisis which began in 2007 significant upward pressures on the Swiss Franc developed. This development gained momentum as tensions in the Eurozone increased and the European Central Bank entered a commitment to fight the threat of a breakup of the Eurozone (Shambaugh, 2012) . The appreciation of the Franc (by 23 percent in real terms between the end of 2007 and the end of 2010) dramatically worsened the competitive position of the Swiss exporters.
1 This development led to major interventions by the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The central bank's purchases of vast amounts of Euros resulted in a quadrupling of the official currency holdings within two years. These interventions -while slowing the ascent of the international Franc value -were not sufficient to stop the Swiss Franc's general tendency to appreciate. In consequence the SNB experienced very considerable losses on its foreign exchange holdings (valued at 19.2 billion Francs in 2010). Given the continuing upward pressure on the Swiss Franc, the SNB, on September 6, 2011, introduced a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Francs against the Euro.
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Hence, we abstract from intertemporal trade and from capital as a factor of production. Maximizing profits in both countries determines the equilibrium levels of output and prices. Since the equilibrium prices are relative prices we are free to set the absolute price of one good and make this good the numeraire. For our purpose we choose 1 12  P . The fact that prices in the model are determined up to a multiplicative constant (here chosen to be 1) implies that only the difference in inflation rates between the two countries is determined (i.e., not each country's inflation rate). P a P a P a n Q   Whereas quantities and prices depend on the size of economy 2 relative to economy 1 (i.e., on parameter n) there remains no effect of the size n when we compute growth rate differentials for the real GDPs and the CPIs of the two countries. For the calculation of the real GDP growth and inflation rates we use the concept of the Laspeyres index. In order to evaluate inflation differentials and their connections we consider changes in sector-productivities as drivers. 
Hence, a positive inflation difference between country 1 and country 2 (i.e., a real appreciation of country 1's exchange rate) only occurs when there is a difference in the two countries' productivity growth in their sectors producing non-tradable goods. In contrast to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the inflation differential is not affected by diverging developments in the productivity of traded goods but in the non-traded goods sectors. The country with the lower Vol. 9, No. 8; 2016 productivity growth in its non-tradable goods sector sees its inflation run higher than the other country. The country with the higher productivity growth sees its price level sink relative to that of the other country. This mechanism offers a plausible explanation for the course of the real Swiss Franc-Euro rate. In the light of historically poor Swiss productivity in the non-tradable goods sector compared with EU countries and in response to the financial crisis and the recession of 2009 several economic policies were implemented in Switzerland in order to increase productivity, particularly in the domestic sector. Productivity in the sector producing non-tradable goods of the Swiss economy was spurred by several measures. Notable political measures that were taken concerned agriculture, the health services and the construction industry (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2013 . An increase in the productivity of the domestically oriented part of the Swiss economy by 1.5 percent more than the growth in Germany is thus plausible. This is the extent of the average annual real depreciation of the Swiss Franc during the time with the Euro-floor.
Conclusions
The Swiss National Bank took an unorthodox measure in 2011 and introduced an exchange rate floor to prevent a further appreciation of the Swiss Franc relative to the Euro. The introduction of the Swiss Franc exchange rate floor was mainly driven by a concern for the Swiss exporting sector and the jobs involved. This step successfully stopped recessionary pressures on the Swiss economy for three years. Under the pressures invoked by the ECB's looming program of quantitative easing the Swiss National Bank in January 2015 gave up supporting a lower floor of its exchange rate relative to the Euro. The key argument by the SNB in favor of a renewed floating of the Swiss Franc was the likely prospect of a massive necessary increase in the SNB's purchases of Euros under the alternative of maintaining the exchange rate floor. This paper points to another challenge of the quasi-fixed Euro-Swiss Franc rate. Given the low inflation in the Eurozone even a currency that is subject to strong appreciation pressures can experience a real depreciation. In fact, Swiss inflation during the period of the exchange rate floor ran markedly below German inflation. We show that based on historical and analytical arguments Swiss deflation in an international environment of low inflation must be seen as a possible scenario. How, then, can the abandoning of the exchange rate floor in early 2015 which negatively affected Swiss exporters be explained in this light? We see this latter choice as driven at least in part by the deflationary pressures that built up under the exchange rate floor which, upon reflection, could have been anticipated at the time when the measure was first considered. The paper also offers a theoretical contribution with a simple computable equilibrium model of the real exchange rate. In contrast to the contributions of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) our model puts emphasis on the effects of productivity growth in the non-traded goods sectors of economies.
